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Abstract 
We present novel data on the role of attention in eliciting enhanced processing of 
stimuli associated with self. Participants were required to make pro- or anti-saccades 
according to whether learned shape-label pairings matched or mismatched. When stimuli 
matched participants were required to make an anti-saccade and when the stimuli 
mismatched a pro-saccade was required. We found that anti-saccades were difficult to 
make to stimuli associated with self when compared to stimuli associated with a friend and 
a stranger. In contrast, anti-saccades to friend-stimuli were easier to make than anti-
saccades to stranger-stimuli. In addition, a correct anti-saccade to a self-associated stimulus 
disrupted subsequent pro-saccade trials, relative to when the preceding anti-saccade was 
made to other stimuli. The data indicate that self-associated stimuli provide a strong cue for 
explicit shifts of attention to them, and that correct anti-saccades to such stimuli demand 
high levels of inhibition (which carries over to subsequent pro-saccade trials). The self 
exerts an automatic draw on attention.  
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Introduction 
It is known that human cognition is strongly modulated by self-bias. Information 
encoded in relation to the self tends to be better remembered and recollected than other 
information (Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008); people respond faster to their own faces 
rather than to those of others (Ma & Han, 2010; Theeuwes, Van der Stigchel, & Olivers, 
2006); responses to their own objects are faster and more accurate compared to responses 
to objects owned by others (Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011). Recently, the 
effects of self-biases have been found even in simple perceptual tasks (Sui, He, & 
Humphreys, 2012; Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014). Specifically, in a task where 
participants associate simple geometric shapes with personal labels (you, friend, or stranger) 
and then immediately judge whether subsequent label–shape pairings matched, there are 
faster responses and higher perceptual sensitivity to self-associations compared with other-
associations (Sui et al., 2012). Previous research provides strong evidence that the effects 
of self: (i) are stable over time (Stolte, Yankouskaya, Humphreys, & Sui, 2015); (ii) mimic 
behavioural and neural responses generated by stimuli with high perceptual saliency (Sui, 
Liu, Mevorach, & Humphreys, 2013); (iii) are automatic and not easily overruled even if 
participants set an expectation for another stimulus (friend or stranger) on the trial (Sui, et 
al., 2014); (iv) alter perceptual processing even when the shape is subsequently presented 
without the label (Sui, Yankouskaya, & Humphreys, 2015) 
Although the effect of self-prioritization in perceptual matching is robust, it remains 
unknown where the effect comes from. Recent studies have shown that the self-
prioritization effect may reflect attentional biases to self-related stimuli (Alexopoulos, 
Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012; Bredart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006). The results in 
behavioual studies are also supported by neuroimaging work demonstrating that self-
associated stimuli as distractors elicit increased activation over the attentional neural 
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network (Sui, Liu, et al., 2015). There is also evidence of self-related attentional biases 
from ERP studies. For example, researchers have reported that when an item is cued as 
being relevant to the self, the amplitude of P300 component was increased compared to an 
other-relevant cue, indicating an enhanced attentional processing to the item. This has been 
attributed to self-related stimuli narrowing the range of spatial attention, indexed by 
reduction of the amplitude of the occipital P1 component elicited by task-irrelevant probes 
when participants responded to self-relevant objects (Turk, van Bussel, Brebner, et al., 
2011). 
 However, a number of other studies provide contradictory evidence (Devue, 
Laloyaux, Feyers, Theeuwes, & Bredart, 2009; Devue, Van der Stigchel, Bredart, & 
Theeuwes, 2009; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003; Kawahara & Yamada, 2004). For 
example, Devue et al. (2006) measured eye-tracking movements in visual search for self-
faces among other faces and suggested that the self-prioritization effect reflects a difficulty 
in disengaging attention from highly familiar faces, rather than differential attentional 
engagement. Bundesen et al. (1997) reported that presenting the participant’s own name as 
a distractor did not cause more interference than other names, but participants were more 
accurate in reporting their own name presented as targets. These authors suggested that the 
advantage for the participant’s own name as a target was not attentional, but rather reflected 
a better identification of the participant’s own name compared with other names. Other 
researchers have argued that self-related stimuli capture attention only when they are 
presented within the participant’s attentional focus (i.e., at fixation) and when the stimuli 
are task-relevant (Gronau et al., 2003; Kawahara & Yamada, 2004). Notably visual search 
tasks typically use complex stimuli (e.g., faces) which may involve several stages of 
information processing, and hence these studies do not rule out the possibility that self-
related stimuli can capture attention with simple displays.  
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In the present study we assessed whether stimuli associated with the self can capture 
attention with simple displays using a measure of explicit attention based on eye tracking. 
To do this we had participants carry out a perceptual matching task similar to that 
previously used to elicit self-bias (Sui, Liu, et al., 2009; Sui et al., 2012), but required eye 
movements to be made to signal the response. Participants first associated three different 
shapes (e.g., circle, triangle, square) with three labels (letters represented You, Friend, 
Stranger). By having people associate the shapes with social labels, the neutral geometric 
shapes are ‘tagged’ with social relevance (Sui et al., 2012). This procedure allows us study 
how basic perceptual processing for that shape changes when compared with other matched 
shapes (e.g., Sui, et al., 2014). They then saw displays in which the label appeared at 
fixation and the shape was presented at a peripheral location in either left or right visual 
field. If the label and the shape matched, the participants had to make an anti-saccade. If the 
label and shape mismatched, a pro-saccade had to be made. This task, which required 
voluntary control of attention, allows a precise assessment of the effects of self information 
on top-down cognitive control. Specifically, comparing the accuracy of eye-movements for 
conditions that involved competition between a reflexive saccadic response and the 
voluntary inhibition of the reflexive tendency (on anti-saccade trials) enabled us to test: (i) 
whether it is more difficult to make an anti-saccade to self-related compared to other-
related stimuli; (ii) what is the cost of voluntary attentional control for self compared to 
friend and stranger associations.  
METHOD 
Participants  
Thirty four healthy participants (18 to 35 years, M = 25.18, SD = 5.32) were recruited 
for the study. Data from one participant were excluded from later analyses due to data lost 
for three out of five experimental blocks. The remaining sample of 33 participants (18 
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females) were right handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no 
neurological history. This experiment was approved by Central University of Oxford 
Research Ethics Committee (CUREC). All participants provided informed consent. 
Materials 
The experiment comprised a 3 shapes x 3 labels x 2 conditions (matching, 
mismatching) design. The assignment of label and shape was balanced across participants 
following a Latin square. The letters Y, F and S were used to represent ‘you’, ‘friend’ and 
‘stranger’ respectively and were paired with three out of four simple geometric shapes (a 
square, triangle, circle or diamond). Each display consisted of a dark grey background with 
a centrally presented white letter and a shape placed on the left or on the right from the 
letter at visual degrees of 6.8°. Both the letters and the shape were of 2.8° in size. Stimulus 
sets, randomized across participants, were consisted of pairings of three of the four 
geometric shapes with the letters Y, F and S. 
The experiment was implemented and run in Matlab (32-bit version R2012a; The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA) Psychotoolbox and conducted with the Tobii TX300 eye tracker, 
running at 300 Hz on a 22-inch screen (51×32 degree of visual angle, 1920×1080 pixels, 
100ppi). To minimize head movement and maintain the distance between eyes and the 
centre of monitor constant (60 cm), participants’ heads were secured in a chin-rest. The 
eye-tracking system was calibrated for each participant using a 9-point calibration scheme. 
Verification of each point calibration involved ensuring that fixation of the eye was within 
2° of each calibration point. The calibration was repeated if a participant failed to fixate on 
less than seven out of nine points within the defined accuracy limit. Following the 
acceptance of the calibration, the task instructions appeared on screen. 
Procedure 
 First, participants were asked to make associations between a shape and self 
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(represented by the letter Y1), a shape and a close friend (represented by the letter F), and a 
shape and a complete stranger (represented by the letter S)2. Based on previous studies 
showing that participants can rapidly gain associations between the shapes and labels just 
after an association instruction (Sui et al., 2012, 2014), we had participants perform 24 
practice trials to reinforce associations between the letters and shapes trials where they 
indicated their responses (‘match’ or ‘mismatch’) by pressing buttons on a keyboard. After 
each trial they were provided with feedback on accuracy.  
 After the initial associations, participants were asked to make a saccadic response 
(‘look at the shape presented’) for mismatching pairings between a letter and a shape, and 
an anti-saccadic response (‘look in the direction opposite the shape presented’) for 
matching trials. The participants then performed eight practice trials followed by five 
blocks of 48 trials each (24 required anti-saccadic responses) yielding a total of 240 
experimental trials. The experiment lasted around 1.2 hour. 
Each trial started with a black fixation cross (1° of visual angle) which appeared for 
500 ms in the centre of the screen which participants were instructed to focus on. If a 
participant was unable to focus on the fixation cross during this time, a display stimulus 
was not presented, the trial was recorded as a miss, and added to the end of the block. This 
criterion was set up to ensure that participants focused at the centre of the screen before the 
stimuli appeared in order to accurately and consistently record eye-movements. On valid 
trials, when the fixation cross disappeared, the stimulus pairs were presented for 800 ms 
followed by a 700ms blank screen before the start of the next trial (Figure 1). After each 
block participants were given a 5 min break. 
                                                 
1 Our previous work showed that there were no significant differences in the magnitude of 
self-biases elicited by an association to a shape with a label ‘you’ or a label ‘me’ or 
‘myself’.  
2 For each participant we carefully checked whether the participant’s initials might interfere 
with the labels. Two out of 34 participants’ surnames started with the letter ‘S’, and one 
participants’ first name started with the letter ‘F’. We found no evidence for interference.  
 9 
(Figure 1 about here) 
We first flagged data (0.15% across all trials) where the eye tracker lost the eye data 
momentarily. The flagged data were replaced with last known good value. Blink (3.1%) 
and missed (0.42%) trials were identified and excluded from the analysis. Saccade onset 
was defined as the time point at which the eye moved 30º of visual angle or faster per 
second (with minimum amplitude of 1.5º). When eye velocity went down again below 30º 
/s, the time point immediately after this sample was regarded as the termination of the 
saccade. Saccadic landing positions was specified for pro-saccade as 2º window around a 
shape, for anti-saccade as 2º window around mirrored shape location. We excluded 2.2% of 
anti-saccade trials and 1.34 % of pro-saccade trials that were outside the landing positions.  
The first saccade after target onset was considered the saccadic response. To 
exclude anticipatory responses, trials with latencies of saccadic responses less than 80 ms 
(2.13 % of valid saccadic trials) and greater than 500 ms (0%) were excluded from 
consequent analysis. Each trial was classified by the condition: stimulus type and saccade 
type (anti-saccade, pro-saccade). There were two measures for the pro-saccade and anti-
saccade trials respectively: saccadic directional accuracy3 (whether the initial saccade 
moved in the correct direction) and saccade latency (the difference in time between the 
presentation of the stimulus to make an eye movement and the beginning of the initial 
saccade). An incorrect saccade direction was defined as the first saccade after a stimulus 
onset towards a shape (on anti-saccade trials), or away from the shape (on pro-saccade 
trials).  
                                                 
3 We emphasize here the term ‘saccadic directional accuracy’ to avoid confusion with 
saccadic accuracy that typically refers to the spatial error between intended and actual 
saccade landing point 
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RESULTS 
Saccadic directional accuracy for anti- and pro-saccade trials 
To examine the effect of the stimulus on saccadic directional accuracy in anti-saccade 
and pro-saccade trials, a two way repeated measures ANOVA was calculated with the 
factors being the saccade type (anti-saccade, pro-saccade) and stimulus (self, friend, 
stranger associations). There was a main effect of saccade type (F(1,32)=18.56, p<0.001,  
ηp2 .65; 90% CI [ 0.47, 0.75]) indicating  that saccadic directional accuracy on anti-saccade 
trials (M=61.6, SD=4.3) was lower than on pro-saccade trials (M=75.9, SD=3.21) (Figure 
2). There was a main effect of stimulus (F(2,64)=6.78, p=0.007, ηp²=.34; 90% CI [ 0.019, 
0.43]) and an interaction of saccade type *stimulus (F(2,64)=8.52, p=0.002, ηp²=.42, 90% 
CI [0 .023, 0.59]). Two separate ANOVAs were performed to test the interaction effect 
(Figure 2). The results show that there was a main effect of stimulus on anti-saccade 
(F(2,64)=8.59, p=0.001, ηp²=.39; 90% CI [ 0.026, 0.48]); there was lower saccadic 
directional accuracy for self compared to friend (t(32)=3.27, p=0.005; dz = 0.56; 95% CI 
for dz  [ 0.35, 0.67]), and for stranger compared to friend stimuli (t(32)=3.5, p=0.004; dz = 
0.60; 95% CI for dz [0.49, 0.74]). No significant differences were found between anti-
saccades for self and stranger although the trend was for responses to be more errors in 
saccadic direction for stranger stimuli (t(32)=1.4, p=0.09, dz = 0.24; 95% CI for dz  [ 0.09, 
0.23]). There was no effect of stimulus on saccadic directional accuracy of pro-saccades 
(F(2,64)=2.1, p=0.16).  
(Figure 2 about here) 
We further examined anti-saccade and pro-saccade saccadic directional accuracy by 
testing whether correct eye-responses for self, friend and stranger stimuli differed from 
chance. One sample t-tests (chance level 50%) showed that saccadic directional accuracy 
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for all stimuli except anti-saccades for self (t(32)=0.92) were significantly higher than 
chance level (t(32)=2.58, p=0.017, dz = 0.44, 95% CI for dz  [ 0.29, 0.52]; t(32)=10.26, 
p<0.001, dz = 1.78, 95% CI for dz  [1.24, 1.93] for friend and stranger anti-saccades 
respectively; t(32)=4.76, p<0.001, dz = 0.82, 95% CI for dz  [0.67, 1.05]; t(32)=9.36, 
p<0.001, dz = 1.62, 95% CI for dz  [1.47, 1.63]; t(32)=6.56, p<0.001, dz = 1.14, 95% CI for 
dz  [1.03, 1.37] for self, friend, stranger pro-saccades respectively).  
 
The cost of voluntary control  
To verify above self-biases in saccadic directional accuracy and reduce the variations 
of conditions, the difference between pro-and anti-saccades in saccadic directional accuracy 
were contrasted for each condition as a measure of the voluntary control of saccades. There 
was a main effect of stimulus type (F(2,64)=7.87, p=0.002, ηp² = .32, 90% CI [0.26, 0.43]) 
showing that the contrast between the two types of saccade was larger for self relative to 
friend (t(32)=3.23, p=0.016, dz = 0.56, 95% CI for dz  [0.39, 0.68]) and stranger stimuli 
(t(32)=2.95, p=0.031, dz = 0.51, 95% CI for dz  [0.26, 0.66]) (Figure 3). There was no 
difference between voluntary control for friend and stranger stimuli (t(32)=1.05, p=0.84, dz 
= 0.18, 95% CI for dz  [0.01, 0.16]). The data indicate that the increased difficulty of 
making an anti-saccade relative to pro-saccade was exacerbated for self-related stimuli.  
(Figure 3 about here) 
Inter-trial effect comparisons  
Further analyses were performed to test the cost of voluntary control by examining 
inter-trial effects of pro-saccades and anti-saccades. We calculated saccadic directional 
accuracy for correct anti-saccade trials (for the self, friend and stranger) preceding correct 
pro-saccade trials (averaged across self, friend and stranger shapes), along also with 
saccadic directional accuracy for correct pro-saccade trials for each shape preceding correct 
anti-saccade trials (averaged across self, friend and stranger stimuli). A two way repeated 
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measures ANOVA with preceding saccade (anti-saccade, pro-saccade) and preceding shape 
type (self, friend, stranger) as within subject factors was carried out to examine the inter-
trial effects. There was a main effect of preceding saccade (F(1,32)=76.79, p<0.001, 
ηp²=.78, 90% CI [0.59, 0.89]); a main effect of shape type (F(2,64)=10.23, p<0.001, 
ηp²=.37, 90% CI [0.21, 0.54]) and an interaction of preceding saccade* preceding shape 
type (F(2,64)=11.68, p<0.001, ηp²=.39; 90% CI [0.22, 0.57]).  
To explore the interaction effect, two separate ANOVAs were performed for each 
type of preceding saccade. In the first ANOVA we examined whether anti-saccades for 
self, friend and stranger on trial N-1 had a differential effect on saccadic directional 
accuracy of the next pro-saccade trial (trial N). The results showed significantly lower 
accuracy in pro-saccade trials preceded by correct self-anti-saccades compared to pro-
saccades preceded by correct anti-saccades to friend stimuli (t(32)=5.9, p<0.001, dz = 1.03, 
95% CI for dz  [0.66, 1.29]) and to stranger stimuli (t(32)=7.1, p<0.001, dz = 1.23, 95% CI 
for dz  [1.02, 1.44])  (overall, F(2,64)=11.47, p<0.001, ηp²=.39; 90% CI [0.11, 0.52]). There 
was no difference in saccadic directional accuracy of pro-saccades preceded by correct 
friend and stranger-anti-saccades (t(32)=0.85) (Figure 4, a). The second ANOVA tested 
whether making a preceding correct pro-saccade to self, friend and stranger shapes affected 
saccadic directional accuracy for the next anti-saccade trial. The result indicated that there 
was no differential effect of the preceding pro-saccade on anti-saccade saccadic accuracy 
(F(2,64)=0.41 (Figure 4, b). 
 (Figure 4 about here) 
Saccade latencies 
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In addition to measuring saccadic directional accuracy, we calculated the latency of 
the first correct and incorrect eye-movement4. First, a two way repeated measures ANOVA 
was carried out to examine the effect of saccade type (anti-saccade, pro-saccade) and 
stimulus (self, friend, stranger) on latency of correct responses (Figure 5). There was a 
main effect of saccade type (F(1,32)=12.95, p=0.001, ηp²=.39, 90% CI [0.19, 0.56]) 
indicating that latencies for pro-saccade trials were shorter compared to anti-saccade trials. 
No other terms were found significant (no main effect of stimulus (F(2,64)=0.79; no 
interaction of saccade type*stimulus (F(2,64)=0.88)). 
(Figure 5 about here) 
Then, a similar two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the latency 
of incorrect responses. There were no main effects of saccade type (F(1,32)=0.25) and 
stimulus  (F(1,32)=0.404). However, the interaction between saccade type and stimulus 
(F(2, 64)=3.26, p=0.044 ηp²=.09, 90% CI [0.07, 0.18]) was significant (Figure 6). Paired 
sample t-test showed that latency of incorrect responses for self anti-saccade condition was 
significantly shorter compared to incorrect responses for self saccade condition (t(32)=2.63, 
p=0.031, dz = 0.43, 95% CI for dz  [0.23, 0.57]) . No reliable differences were found 
between friend anti-saccade and friend saccade trials (t(32)=0.036, and between stranger 
anti-saccade and stranger saccade conditions (t(32)=0.12. 
 (Figure 6 about here) 
Our inter-trial comparisons showed significantly lower accuracy in pro-saccade trials 
preceded by correct self-anti-saccades compared to pro-saccades preceded by other-anti-
saccades (Figure 4).  If the preceding correct self-anti-saccade are required more control 
(inhibition) to be generated, we may expect that the subsequent pro-saccades are also 
                                                 
4 We also examined the effect of stimuli on the amplitude of saccadic responses, but no 
significant differences were found between the conditions. 
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delayed5. To test this assumption, we calculated saccadic latency for correct anti-saccade 
trials (for the self, friend and stranger) preceding correct pro-saccade trials (averaged across 
self, friend and stranger shapes), along with saccadic latency for correct pro-saccade trials 
for each shape preceding correct anti-saccade trials (averaged across self, friend and 
stranger stimuli).  
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with preceding saccade (anti-saccade, pro-
saccade) and preceding shape type (self, friend, stranger) as within subject factors was 
carried out to examine the inter-trial effects on saccadic latency (Figure 7). There was a 
main effect of preceding shape type (F(2,64)=4.4, p=0.016, ηp²=.12, 90% CI [0.06, 0.23]) 
indicating that preceding self-shape slowed down saccadic latency on the subsequent pro-
saccades. There was no effect of preceding saccade (F(1,32)=0.22 or interaction effect 
(F(2,64)=1.78, p=0.17). To explore the effect of preceding shape type, two separate 
ANOVAs were performed on the saccadic latency for anti-saccades and pro-saccades. 
There was a main effect of preceding shape type in anti-saccade trials (F(2,64)=5.11, 
p=0.009, ηp²=.14, 90% CI [0.08, 0.41] showing significant delays in pro-saccades preceded 
by self-shape compared to friend-shape (p=0.003) and stranger-shape (p=0.037) (adjusted 
for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction). No effect of preceding shape type in 
pro-saccade trials was found (F(2,64)=0.41).  
(Figure 7 about here) 
 
DISCUSSION 
In line with previous findings, our results show that anti-saccadic responses elicit 
more saccadic errors compared to pro-saccades (Barton, Raoof, Jameel, & Manoach, 2006; 
Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen, & de Jong, 2004; Hallett, 1978).  More pertinently, 
                                                 
5 Thanks to the anonymous reviewer who pointed this out. 
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however, this effect was stronger for self than friend stimuli. In addition, relative to 
stranger stimuli, self stimuli showed a significantly greater contrast between pro- and anti-
saccade trials and anti-saccades only for self-stimuli.  Furthermore, our data showed greater 
disruption on pro-saccades when the preceding trial required an anti-saccade to self-stimuli 
compared with other stimuli. Taken together, both findings indicate (i) an increase in the 
relative difficulty of anti-saccades for self-related items, (ii) larger disruption in pro-
saccade responses (in both saccadic directional accuracy and latency) preceded by self-anti-
saccades. This latter finding may stem from the requirement to inhibit a pro-saccade to the 
self stimulus when an anti-saccade was required on trial N-1, which may then make it more 
difficult to generate a pro-saccade on trial N. Furthermore, our data of the latency of 
incorrect responses showed that only for ‘self’ condition incorrect responses for the anti-
saccade trials were significantly shorter compared to pro-saccade trials. The results suggest 
that there are qualitative differences in the ability to generate an anti-saccade away from a 
stimulus associated with the self compared with other people. Note that this result is highly 
unlikely to reflect the difficulty of matching self-related stimuli since a strong advantage 
for matching self-related items has been consistently demonstrated in the literature (e.g., 
Sui et al., 2012).    
Current views on anti-saccadic responses (e.g., Barton, Raoof, Jamel, & Manoach, 
2006; Munoz & Everling 2004) propose an involvement of two processing stages that are 
linked to two independent mechanisms: (1) suppressing an automatic pro-saccade eye-
movement and (2) generating instead a voluntary saccade in the opposite direction. 
Presumably, the higher cost of voluntary control for self-associated responses may reflect 
either or both stages together. If the cost of voluntary control is linked to the suppression of 
reflexive saccades (e.g., if the inhibition of pre-target activity for the self takes longer 
compared to that for others due to stronger attentional capture), but the generation of a 
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voluntary saccade remains the same for all stimuli, then we should expect longer latencies 
for self-anti-saccades compared to others. However, we found no significant differences in 
correct anti-saccade latency between the conditions. On the other hand, there may need to 
be more inhibition of the pro-saccade to self stimuli, even if the time to generate effective 
inhibition (e.g., to enable an anti-saccade to be made) does not differ for the contrasting 
stimuli. It would then follow that it may be more difficult to generate a subsequent pro-
saccade, since the pro-saccade will be strongly inhibited. This is what we observed. Our 
results on inter-trial effects support the idea that there is greater suppression of pro-
saccades to make an anti-saccade to a self-related stimulus. We also observed longer 
latency on pro-saccades preceded by self-anti-saccades. This finding further support the 
idea that the correct anti-saccades for self-associated stimuli require more control 
(inhibition) to be generated.  
In contrast to the effects of self-related stimuli, anti-saccades to friend-related stimuli 
were easier to make than those to stimuli related to a stranger. This result is interesting 
since it indicates a dissociation between effects of self-association (disrupting anti-
saccades) and effects of familiarity (the association to a friend). We propose that familiar 
stimuli (friend associations) are processed more efficiently than unfamiliar stimuli (stranger 
associations) and exert a reduced cost on difficult responses (anti-saccades). Self-related 
stimuli, on the other hand, cue attention to themselves, disrupting anti-saccades.  Our 
results provide strong support for the attentional draw of self-associated stimuli and suggest 
that voluntary saccadic responses away from a self-related item demand greater inhibition 
than is the case for stimuli related to other people.  
In addition, a recent eye-tracking study (Siebold, Weaver, Donk, & van Zoest, 2016) 
using an oculomotor visual search paradigm did not find the effects of self on an early 
perceptual level. In this study, participants were required to form associations between two 
 17 
orientation lines (right- and left-tilted) and two labels (‘you' and ‘stranger'), and then make 
a speeded eye-movements to one of the two lines without any task instruction (Experiment 
1), to dot probe target located on one of the two lines (Experiment 2), or to the line that was 
cued by its associated label (Experiment 3). Similar to our finding, there was no effect of 
self-prioritization on involuntary eye-movements. Furthermore, the study suggests that top-
down information affects detection responses, but not localization of socially salient 
stimuli, providing indirect support for our conclusion that once a ‘self-cued' stimulus is 
detected, it is more difficult to control involuntary eye-movement. 
The results of the present study raise an important question for further studies: what is 
the relationship between individual differences in the magnitude of self-biases (i.e., the 
response time advantage for stimuli associated with self compared to other) and the cost of 
voluntary control of saccades for self.  If the magnitude of the facilitation effect for self-
associated stimuli can predict the cost of self-related attentional control, this may have 
important implications in neuropsychological studies (e.g., in patients with lesions affecting 
brain regions shown to be related to self-biases (van den Bos & Güroğlu, 2009) and the 
frontal eye fields (Machado & Rafal, 2003), patients suffering from depression (Koenigs & 
Grafman, 2009).  
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Figure 1. Trial sequence  
Figure.2 Saccadic directional accuracy for anti-saccades and pro-saccades for self, friend 
and stranger stimuli. Error bars represent +/- 1SEM. The stars indicate significant 
differences between a pair of conditions (adjusted for multiple comparisons using 
Bonferroni correction). 
 
Figure 3. Saccadic directional accuracy difference between pro- and anti-saccades. Error 
bars represent +/- 1SEM. The stars indicate significant differences between a pair of 
conditions (adjusted for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction). 
 
Figure 4. Inter-trial effects of preceding self-, friend-, stranger-anti-saccades on the 
accuracy of the next pro-saccade trials (a); and effects of preceding self-, friend- stranger-
pro-saccades on the directional accuracy of the next anti-saccade trial (b). Error bars 
represent +/- 1 SEM. The stars indicate significant differences between a pair of conditions 
(adjusted for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction). 
 
Figure 5. Latency for correct anti-saccade and pro-saccade trials. Error bars represent +/- 
1SEM. 
 
Figure 6. Latency for incorrect anti-saccade and pro-saccade trials. Error bars represent +/- 
1SEM. 
 
Figure 7. Inter-trial effects of preceding self-, friend-, stranger-anti-saccades on the latency 
of the next pro-saccade trials (a); and effects of preceding self-, friend- stranger-pro-
saccades on the latency of the next anti-saccade trial (b). Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. 
The stars indicate significant differences between a pair of conditions (adjusted for multiple 
comparisons using Bonferroni correction). 
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